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Does R. G. Collingwood’s meta-philosophical theory that 
concepts in philosophy are organized as “scales of forms” 
apply to his own work on the nature of history? Or is there 
some inconsistency between Collingwood’s work as a 
philosopher of history and as a theorist of philosophical 
method? This article surveys existing views among 
Collingwood specialists on the applicability of Collingwood’s 
“scale of forms” thesis to his own philosophy of history, 
especially the accounts of Leon Goldstein and Lionel Rubinoff, 
and outlines the obvious objections to such an application. 
These objections however are found to be answerable. It is 
shown that Collingwood did indeed think the scale of forms 
thesis should apply to the philosophy of history, and even that 
he identified the “highest” form in history as a kind of scientific 
research or inquiry. But it is not demonstrated that Collingwood 
identified the “lower” forms explicitly. An account is then 
provided of the three distinct forms that can be identified in 
Collingwood’s philosophy of history, and of the “critical 
points” by which (according to Collingwood’s philosophical 
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method) lower forms are negated and incorporated by higher 
forms. But it is also explained that these forms are not neatly 
coterminous with the stages in Western philosophical thinking 




R. G. Collingwood – philosophy of history – meta-philosophy – 
methodology – metaphysics – epistemology 
 
“[T]he philosophy of history is nothing but the deliberate 
attempt to answer the question ‘what is history?’”1 
 
THE SCALE OF FORMS THESIS 
According to R. G. Collingwood, there are various ways by 
which we can define what we mean by a word in non-
philosophical discussion. But in philosophical discussion, 
Collingwood thinks, where we attempt to deploy the special 
philosophical meaning of such words,2 we must specify our 
                                                 
1 R. G. Collingwood, Essays in the Philosophy of History, ed. 
William Debbins (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967), 
126. 
2 R. G. Collingwood, An Essay on Philosophical Method [1933] 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 2005), 33-35. 
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concepts “in a somewhat peculiar way.”3 We employ what 
Collingwood calls a “scale of forms”4 to clarify concepts 
incrementally. The “members” of such a scale are so related 
that each embodies the “generic essence” of the concept in 
some way.5 Each higher term is a “different” but also a “more 
adequate embodiment of the generic essence”.6 And “whenever 
the variable, increasing or decreasing, reaches certain points on 
the scale, one specific form disappears and is replaced by 
another”:7 these, Collingwood explains, are “critical points on a 
scale of degrees where a new specific form suddenly comes 
into being.”8 The higher term “negates” the lower “as a false 
embodiment,” but “at the same time reaffirms it … as part and 
parcel of itself.”9 So while each higher term reveals the lower 
to be the wrong way of specifying the whole concept, it also 
incorporates it as an element within this new whole.10 Lower 
forms are defective from the point of view of higher forms; 
                                                 
3 Collingwood, Essay on Philosophical Method, 57. 
4 Collingwood, Essay on Philosophical Method, 54-91. 
5 Collingwood, Essay on Philosophical Method, 57. 
6 Collingwood, Essay on Philosophical Method, 88. 
7 Collingwood, Essay on Philosophical Method, 57. 
8 Collingwood, Essay on Philosophical Method, 57. 
9 Collingwood, Essay on Philosophical Method, 88. 
10 Collingwood, Essay on Philosophical Method, 89. 
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indeed they might even appear as “opposites”.11 Collingwood 
spends four pages of his Essay on Philosophical Method (1933) 
explaining that philosophers including Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, 
Kant, and even Locke12 have defined their philosophical 
concepts in this way, and devotes thirty more pages to 
vindicating that method. Everywhere in philosophy, he writes, 
“the same rule holds good.”13 
But does this “meta-philosophical” rule, or rule of 
philosophical method—which is supposed to hold good 
everywhere—apply to Collingwood’s own philosophy of 
history? Certainly several of his readers have discerned 
different ideas of history in his writings. Alan Donagan finds in 
Collingwood’s essay, “Historical Evidence”, the “three forms 
of historical thinking which have been practised since the 
Renaissance.”14 More recently, Giuseppina D’Oro has 
identified a “factual” conception of history, a “formal” 
                                                 
11 Collingwood, Essay on Philosophical Method, 84. 
12 Collingwood, Essay on Philosophical Method, 57-61. 
13 Collingwood, Essay on Philosophical Method, 44; see also 
R. G. Collingwood, The New Leviathan: or Man, Society, 
Civilization and Barbarism [1942] revised edition, ed. David 
Boucher (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 70. 
14 Alan Donagan, The Later Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 177-182. 
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conception, and a “substantive” conception.15 Other 
Collingwood scholars have sought to elucidate ostensibly 
unitary accounts of “history as” in full-length studies: Jan van 
der Dussen’s History as a Science (1981),16 for example; W. H. 
Dray’s History as Re-Enactment (1995);17 and Stein Helgeby’s 
Action as History (2004).18 
Since Collingwood’s plan for his Essays, Principles, 
and Ideas books was never completed, there is some 
speculation concerning the fit of these ostensibly distinct 
conceptions of history with the scale of forms thesis. James 
Connelly has proposed that the two volumes of Philosophical 
Essays (of which An Essay on Philosophical Method is the 
first) “would have elucidated both the approach and subject 
matter of … The Principles of History”,19 while The Idea of 
                                                 
15 Giuseppina D’Oro, “On Collingwood’s Conceptions of 
History,” Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 7 (2000), 
45-69. 
16 J. W. van der Dussen, History as a Science: The Philosophy 
of R. G. Collingwood (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981). 
17 W. H. Dray, History as Re-Enactment: R. G. Collingwood’s 
Idea of History [1995] (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001). 
18 Stein Helgeby, Action as History: The Historical Thought of 
R. G. Collingwood (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004). 
19 James Connelly, Metaphysics, Method and Politics: The 
Political Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood (Exeter: Imprint 
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History was intended to be an essay “of historical metaphysics 
displaying an historical scale of forms.”20 So as Connelly sees 
it, The Principles of History and The Idea of History would 
have comprised “a concrete application [to history] of the view 
of philosophy developed in the two Essays.”21 Other readers, 
such as Lionel Rubinoff and Leon Goldstein, have even 
attempted to construct content for that sort of application, 
identifying different ideas of history in Collingwood’s thinking 




But this application of the scale of forms thesis to 
Collingwood’s writings on history—which for ease I will call 
the “application” theory—is open to several objections. First, 
Collingwood never says, in The Idea of History or in The 
Principles of History, that he is following his scale of forms 
                                                                                                        
Academic, 2003), 14. 
20 Connelly, 14; see also 76. 
21 Connelly, 14-15. 
22 See Lionel Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of 
Metaphysics: A Study in the Philosophy of Mind (University 
of Toronto Press, 1970), 132-49; Leon J. Goldstein, “The Idea 
of History as a Scale of Forms,” History and Theory 29, no. 4 
(Dec 1990), 42-50. 
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method. Although his work contains plenty of statements 
beginning “history is”, and “history means”, none of the 
definitions that follow is ever identified as a “form” of a 
concept. History is almost never explicitly defined at all, and 
where the term “the definition of history” does appear, it is only 
in the context of prolegomena or an introduction to a lecture 
series.23 Certainly different accounts of history are described as 
improving upon one another in The Idea of History, but never 
as overlapping, or as part of a scale. Indeed the formal language 
of the Essays—An Essay on Philosophical Method and An 
Essay on Metaphysics—is hardly used. 
Further, there is no obvious evidence that Collingwood 
planned to use a scale of forms in his unfinished The Principles 
of History.24 Indeed, although he intended to discuss “survivals 
                                                 
23 R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History [1946]: with lectures 
1926-1928, ed. Jan van der Dussen (Oxford University Press, 
1993), 9. 
24 See “Notes on Historiography,” in R. G. Collingwood, The 
Principles of History and other writings in philosophy of 
history [1999] ed. W. H. Dray and W. J. van der Dussen 
(Oxford, 2001),  235-250,  245-246. See however also van 
der Dussen’s illuminating discussion of the differences 
between Collingwood’s scheme for The Principles of History, 
and the papers that were recovered in 1995: Collingwood, 
Principles of History, xviii-xx. 
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of the original generalized sense [of history] in modern uses”, 
The Principles of History as Collingwood planned it was only 
to deal “with the specialized sense”—that is, with “history as a 
special science”.25 All of this is perhaps surprising, given the 
high regard in which Collingwood still held his Essay on 
Philosophical Method as he worked on his philosophy of 
history in the later 1930s.26 
Further still, this “application” theory assumes (1) that, 
for Collingwood, history can be treated as a “generic concept”27 
in the first place; and (2) that his work on it can be interpreted 
as a process of attempting to specify that concept.28 In fact in 
Speculum Mentis history is described not as a concept, but as “a 
form of thought”,29 and as “a specific form of experience”.30 
If these objections stand, and the scale of forms thesis 
                                                 
25 Collingwood, Principles of History, 245. 
26 See R. G. Collingwood, An Autobiography and other 
writings: with essays on Collingwood’s life and work, ed. 
David Boucher and Teresa Smith (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 117-118. 
27 Collingwood, Essay on Philosophical Method, 57. 
28 See Collingwood, Essay on Philosophical Method, 92-103, 
and Collingwood, The Idea of History, 9. 
29 R. G. Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, or The Map of 
Knowledge [1924] (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 203. 
30 Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, 205. 
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should not be sought in Collingwood’s philosophy of history, or 
applied to it, then there would seem to be significant 
inconsistency between Collingwood’s writings on his two main 
preoccupations, the nature of history, and the nature of 
philosophy. One or more of these verdicts would seem to 
follow: 
1. If Collingwood’s philosophy of history is good, then his 
scale of forms theory is wrong, or at least he did not put 
much stock in it, because he managed to make advances 
in philosophical thinking on history without following 
his own method. 
2. Collingwood abandoned the scale of forms theory 
between publishing it (1933) and developing his 
thinking on history in the later 1930s. And indeed as 
Teresa Smith has rightly pointed out,31 Collingwood’s 
rapprochements between history and philosophy, and 
between theory and practice, were his priority in the 
later 1930s and early 40s.32 In that later work, 
                                                 
31 In conversation at the PSA British Idealism Specialist Group 
Annual Conference, Gregynog Hall, UK, 18th-20th December, 
2017. 
32 Collingwood, Autobiography, 147-167. See also Christopher 
Fear, “‘Was he right?’ R. G. Collingwood’s Rapprochement 
between Philosophy and History”, Journal of the Philosophy 
of History 11 (2017), 408-424. 
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Collingwood is trying to demonstrate the importance of 
history to philosophy and practice. It is just not on his 
agenda at this time to vindicate any further his earlier 
scale of forms thesis. 
But, although each of these possible verdicts leaves 
Collingwood’s achievements in philosophy of history 
unchallenged, each implicitly undermines an indispensable 
thesis of his Essay on Philosophical Method. Conversely, if 
Collingwood’s scale of forms theory is sound, then its absence 
from his philosophy of history would lead to one of two other 
possible verdicts: 
3. Collingwood’s philosophy of history is not as good as it 
should have been, because it attempts to shortcut a 
valuable contribution he had already made to 
philosophical method. Indeed the argument that was on 
his agenda, concerning a rapprochement between 
history and philosophy, is also weakened if the idea of 
history that Collingwood is deploying is not specified 
by adequate philosophical method. 
4. For some reason, Collingwood thinks that the scale of 
forms arrangement does not apply to philosophy of 
history—perhaps because, as above, he does not regard 
history as a true “generic concept”, or because he does 
not consider it specifiable, or because he does not think 




THESIS: HISTORY AS A SCALE OF FORMS 
But even though it was not Collingwood’s priority, and even 
though there is no obvious indication that he tried deliberately 
to follow his own method, or that he considered history a 
“generic concept”, there is some evidence that Collingwood 
nevertheless did think that the scale of forms theory should 
apply to history. In a note concerning the question whether 
nature has a history, he writes: 
 
I seem driven back to the scale of forms (is this 
another ready-made formula? No, not in any bad 
sense, for it was made to fit exactly such cases as 
this). Existence is history, but the scale of 
existences is a scale in which the historical 
character is at first rudimentary and then 
gradually emerges. It will be necessary to trace 
the stages of this emergence. / History in the 
fullest sense—historian’s history—is a thing 
whose nature and methods I know well … But in 
order that there should be history in this highest 
sense there must first be history in a vaguer and 
lower sense.33 
 
                                                 
33 Collingwood, Principles of History, 126-127. 
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Collingwood thinks, then, that the scale of forms thesis 
should apply to philosophy of history. But does his own work 
actually comply? It seems to me that the only way to answer 
this question of a scale of forms for Collingwood’s philosophy 
of history is to identify these “vaguer and lower” forms, and to 
establish whether they relate to each other in the way that 
Collingwood says they should. 
 
INQUIRY AND THE ASSERTION OF FACT 
Let us begin with the form of history that Collingwood 
explicitly identifies when he writes, to himself, that “History in 
the fullest sense—historian’s history—is a thing whose nature 
and methods I know well.”34 Now, as Jan van der Dussen has 
found, Collingwood begins to focus upon history in this sense 
more intensely from around the time of his 1925 essay, “The 
Nature and Aims of a Philosophy of History”, where he begins 
by mentioning “actual historians”.35 History thenceforth is “a 
kind of research or inquiry”36—“scientific”,37 albeit “a special 
                                                 
34 Collingwood, Principles of History, 126-127 (emphasis 
added). 
35 Van der Dussen, History as a Science, 28. 
36 Collingwood, Idea of History, 9. 
37 Collingwood, Autobiography, 122; R. G. Collingwood, An 
Essay on Metaphysics [Oxford: Clarendon, 1940] (Mansfield 
Centre, Connecticut: Martino, 2014), 65; Principles of 
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science”38—in which questions are posed and answered by way 
of evidence and reasoning. For simplicity I will call this highest 
form of history “history as inquiry”. Collingwood’s analysis of 
history as inquiry includes elements of the epistemological, 
methodological, and metaphysical (by Collingwood’s definition 
of metaphysics).39 It explains how historians arrive at their goal 
of accurately re-enacted thoughts,40 how history affords self-
knowledge, and why a rapprochement between history and 
philosophy must be achieved. 
However, van der Dussen also argues that before 1925 
Collingwood had a very different idea of the nature of history, 
which is reflected in his focus on the object of historical 
knowledge. Van der Dussen points to passages such as: “the 
historical consciousness asserts concrete fact”; “[history] does 
not come to the facts with a ready-made law in its hand and try 
to force them into it, throwing them away in disgust when they 
                                                                                                        
History, 7-8, 35; Idea of History, 269-270. 
38 Collingwood, Principles of History, 245. 
39 See Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, 3-48. 
40 See Margit Hurup Nielsen, “Re-Enactment and 
Reconstruction in Collingwood’s Philosophy of History,” 
History and Theory 20, no. 1 (Feb, 1981), 1-31; Karsten R. 
Stueber, “The Psychological Basis of Historical Explanation: 
Reenactment, Simulation, and the Fusion of Horizons,” 
History and Theory 41, no. 1 (Feb, 2002), 25-42. 
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are too hard; it rejoices in their hardness and finds its 
satisfaction in their very diversity and uniqueness”; “The object 
of history is fact as such”; “An historian must state the facts as 
they happened”; and, “History is the knowledge of the infinite 
world of facts”.41 
History for Collingwood before 1925 seems, on this 
account, not to refer to the thing that historians do, but to the 
object to which (or with which) they do it; not to characteristic 
processes, but to the objects dealt with. Thus, according to van 
der Dussen, Speculum Mentis (1924) paints a “plainly realistic 
picture of history,”42 which must have become regrettable to 
Collingwood after his 1925 conversion, and as his more 
sophisticated “idealist” or “anti-realist” account of history 
developed. “When Collingwood, having written this book, 
turned to the actual practice of the science of history,” van der 
Dussen writes, “his treatment of this subject in Speculum 
Mentis—or better, the place he gave it in his system—must 
have been unsatisfactory to him too.”43 
Van der Dussen’s dating of Collingwood’s more focused 
study of historical inquiry is well substantiated by his evidence. 
But it is not true that this earlier definition of history—which 
here I will call history as “the assertion of fact” and “fact as 
                                                 
41 Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, 208, 210, 211, 216, 231. 
42 Van der Dussen, History as a Science, 25. 
43 Van der Dussen, History as a Science, 27. 
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such”—is abandoned or contradicted from 1925/26 onward. It 
is true that there are passages in The Principles of History 
which might be presented as evidence that the earlier idea of 
history is abandoned.44 But there is also plenty of counter-
evidence in the same later work. Collingwood writes: “it is still 
permissible to describe the things that the historian wants to 
know as ‘facts’, for example the ‘fact’ that Aurelian reformed 
the Roman monetary system”, which “is asserted as a fact by 
economic historians … as the conclusion of an argument based 
on analysis of numismatic evidence”;45 “The objectivity of 
historical fact is this: that there was such a fact”;46 “An 
historical cause is a fact or assembly of facts”,47 and “To be 
real, for history, is to be a fact, i.e. objectivity is sought.”48 It is 
true that after 1925/6 Collingwood attacks the notion that the 
                                                 
44 Including: “[To] pretend that the essential element in 
discovery is the ‘apprehension of facts’ … is to undermine 
the foundations of science” (Principles of History, 38); “The 
plausibility of historical naturalism … rested in its day on a 
supposed similarity between the ‘facts’ of history and the 
‘facts’ of natural science.” Collingwood, Principles of 
History, 80. 
45 Collingwood, Principles of History, 81. 
46 Collingwood, Principles of History, 222. 
47 Collingwood, Principles of History, 12. 
48 Collingwood, Principles of History, 135. 
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historian simply “observes” his facts49—but he had never 
claimed otherwise. Indeed, his long-running critique of the 
doctrine that knowing makes no difference to the thing known 
is also in Speculum Mentis50 (where it is part of the 
“breakdown” of history, see below).51 So although 
Collingwood’s later philosophy of history is, as van der Dussen 
says, largely about history as inquiry, he also continues to 
discuss the “object” of historical thought, and to identify it with 
a type of assertion, the assertion of individual things that really 
have happened,52 as he had in Speculum Mentis, where history 
is about “what happens and has happened, and that only”.53 
History as “the assertion of fact” is retained, then, in 
Collingwood’s later thought as a lower form, but is 
supplemented by a later, “higher” form. Despite this, history as 
“the assertion of fact” or “fact as such” is crucial. It is for 
example an essential component of the idea of res gestae—the 
individual “deeds, actions done in the past”54 which the 
historian’s assertions should be about. The survival of “the 
                                                 
49 Collingwood, Principles of History, 80-81; see also 
Collingwood, Idea of History, 66. 
50 Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, 237, 243-245. 
51 Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, 231-239. 
52 Collingwood, Principles of History, 221. 
53 Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, 217. 
54 Collingwood, Principles of History, 40. 
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assertion of fact,” or “fact as such”, secures the individual 
rather than universal nature of the object of historical 
knowledge: facts rather than laws, and concrete ideas rather 
than a priori ideas.55 Those who insisted on this in nineteenth-
century German thought—such as Ranke, Windelband, and 
Rickert—were defending history as an “idiographic” discipline 
distinct from the “nomothetic” sciences which are validated by 
the laws and predictions they offer.56 Collingwood may 
disapprove of the terminology,57 but he shares their view of 
historians who aspire to the methods and aims of natural 
science by “subordinating” individual facts to general laws.58 In 
                                                 
55 Collingwood, Idea of History, 72-73. That is the positive 
claim in Collingwood’s attack on positivism and “Pigeon-
holing.” Collingwood, Principles of History, 19-21. 
56 See Georg G. Iggers, The German Conception of History: The 
National Tradition of Historical Thought from Herder to the 
Present (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1983). 
57 “This distinction he pompously baptized by saying that there 
were two kinds of science (Wissenschaft): nomothetic 
science, which is science in the common sense of the word, 
and idiographic science, which is history.” Collingwood, Idea 
of History, 166. 
58 Collingwood, Principles of History, 78-79, 181-183; 246; and 
Collingwood (quoting Schopenhauer), Idea of History, 167. 
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The Idea of History science presupposes history, just as it does 
in Speculum Mentis, precisely because history is the assertion 
of individual facts from which laws are an abstraction59—an 
assertion made not by a “scientific” (in this case meaning 
“nomothetic” or “positivistic”) consciousness, but by an 
historical consciousness.60 
 
HISTORY AS PROCESS 
Alongside the two forms of history discussed by van der 
Dussen—history as inquiry, and history as “the assertion of 
fact”—there is however also a third form that appears in all of 
Collingwood’s writings on history. I will call this form “history 
as process” for convenience, and because “process” is the term 
Collingwood generally prefers to metonyms such as “change” 
and “transition”—though it is important to note his insistence 
                                                 
59 Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, 202, 218; Collingwood, Idea 
of History, 201. 
60 Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, 201-202. There is a potential 
terminological confusion however between what 
Collingwood means by “scientific” history in Speculum 
Mentis (216), where he means “positivistic,” and what he 
means by it in his later writings, which is “systematic 
thinking.” See Collingwood, Autobiography, 25-26, 30-31; 
Collingwood, Idea of History, 269, 273; Collingwood, Essay 
on Metaphysics, 4. 
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that history not be identified with process per se,61 but 
specifically with development.62 
Process, as continuity and discontinuity,63 is a notable 
focus of Collingwood’s analysis of Greco-Roman 
historiography; it is also the meaning of his identification of 
“What is historical” with “the transitory event”,64 and what “is 
not historical” with “what is unchanging”.65 Indeed it is 
because of the tendency in Greek thought to deny that 
knowledge of the transitory is possible that Collingwood finds 
the creation of historical inquiry by Herodotus “remarkable”.66 
We find this form of history in Collingwood’s plaudits for 
recent French thought,67 and for Vico.68 Process also features 
heavily in The Principles of History, where “This is the 
principle of history, in the wider sense of that word; where 
                                                 
61 Collingwood, Principles of History, 204-208, 244; 
Collingwood, Idea of History, 83. 
62 Collingwood, Idea of History, 121-122, 84-85, 104. See also 
van der Dussen, “Collingwood and the Idea of Progress.” 
63 Collingwood, Idea of History, 14-25, 34. 
64 Collingwood, Idea of History, 42. 
65 Collingwood, Idea of History, 42. See also 20, 22, 48-49, 50-
52, 80, 99-103, 130, 169, 170-208, 184, 359-425. 
66 Collingwood, Idea of History, 20-21. 
67 Collingwood, Idea of History, 184, 189. 
68 Collingwood, Idea of History, 65 (emphasis added). 
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history means process in time”;69 “History is a process which, 
as it goes on in time, creates its own vehicles … and the history 
of anything is the history of the ways in which that thing itself 
changes.”70 It appears in “Notes Towards a Metaphysic”, where 
“in general, history is development: I mean, a process in which 
the form as well as the matter changes, namely becomes 
itself”;71 and it even crops up in The New Leviathan, where “all 
history consists of changes”,72 where “in the life of mind there 
are no states, there are only processes”,73 and where (strikingly) 
“the initial and terminal points of change are not facts (only 
phases of the change are facts); they are abstractions from the 
fact of change.”74 
Of course for Collingwood it is only certain kinds of 
process that history should concern itself with—namely, actions 
with “insides”.75 But Collingwood’s interest in Bergson, 
Alexander, and Whitehead pertains to the experience of process 
as such.76 Bergson’s contribution to the theory of history, for 
                                                 
69 Collingwood, Principles of History, 178. 
70 Collingwood, Principles of History, 251-252. 
71 Collingwood, Principles of History, 127. 
72 Collingwood, New Leviathan, 200. 
73 Collingwood, New Leviathan, 285. 
74 Collingwood, New Leviathan, 241 (emphasis added). 
75 Collingwood, Idea of History, 118. 
76 See Collingwood, Idea of History, 211; Principles of History, 
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Collingwood, lies in his analysis of the individual’s experience 
of what we call “history” when we do not mean the rational 
process of historical knowledge construction or the assertion of 
facts, but just history happening around us and to us: the kind 
of “history” in which past and present interpenetrate in our 
experience.77 A philosophy of history in this distinct sense as 
process would deal with what Collingwood says was the 
subject of his essay Libellus de Generatione: “primarily a study 
of the nature and implications of process or becoming … an 
attack on ‘realism,’ showing how the non possumus of ‘realists’ 
towards a theory of history arose from their refusal to admit the 
reality of becoming.”78 
 
OVERLAP 
Before fitting all this into Collingwood’s philosophical method, 
let us survey the components. The meaning of “history” in 
Collingwood’s work takes three distinct forms:79 
                                                                                                        
56, 185, 170-171, 251 n.1. 
77 Collingwood, Idea of History, 187-188. 
78 Collingwood, Autobiography, 99 (emphasis added). 
79 This is a provisional minimum. Other readers might add 
further forms, so long as they are truly distinct. Margit Hurup 
Grove has also suggested that other forms that might be 
considered distinct are (4) history as a product of work for 




1. history as “the assertion of fact”; 
2. history as process; and 
3. history as a type of (scientific) inquiry. (This is the 
“highest” or “fullest” form.) 
 
Conceptually, Collingwood’s combination of these 
forms is quite straightforward, such that he does in fact attempt 
to capture all three in summary definitions of history—as in 
The Idea of History, where he writes, “History is [3] a science 
of human action: what the historian puts before himself is [1] 
things that men have done in the past, and these belong to [2] a 
world of change.”80 This is probably the closest thing we get 
from Collingwood to a short statement of the “generic essence” 
of history.81 Sometimes however Collingwood’s summary 
definitions include two forms, but leave out the other, as 
                                                                                                        
reconciled and incorporated into the present. Certainly these 
ideas of history should be accommodated in a putatively 
comprehensive account of Collingwood’s philosophy of 
history. In conversation [details removed for peer review] 
80 Collingwood, Idea of History, 20. 
81 An earlier attempt, in “The Philosophy of History” (1930), is 
noticeably rougher: “History is knowledge of the past, and 
the past consists of events that have finished happening.” 
Collingwood, Essays in the Philosophy of History, 136. 
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elsewhere in The Idea of History: “history must have these two 
characteristics: first it must be about [2] what is transitory, and 
secondly it must be [3] scientific or demonstrative.”82 
These three distinct forms combine to produce concepts 
that are crucial to philosophical understanding of history. The 
first and second forms, “the assertion of fact” and “history as 
process”, combine to define the form of history’s “subject-
matter”: namely, unique processes of a certain kind which are 
asserted as having happened, or as really happening. Res gestae 
are concrete facts that are [3] constructed by an intellectual 
process of abstraction from certain types of [2] process, and 
which are then [1] asserted. Without the first form, the subject-
matter of history would be processes alone, which need not be 
asserted as factual, or indeed asserted at all, merely 
experienced, as for Bergson. And without the second form, the 
subject-matter of history would be individual facts or states of 
affairs at points in time, which could be asserted separately, but 
not narrated as a process by which one becomes another.83 So 
Collingwood’s conception of the subject-matter of history 
combines these two necessary but nevertheless distinct forms: 
[1] facts in their concrete individuality, (“abstract 
                                                 
82 Collingwood, Idea of History, 21. There may of course be a 
rhetorical or pedagogical reason for this formulation, which is 
taken from a lecture on Greek thought. 
83 See Collingwood, Principles of History, 183. 
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individualities”84), and [2] the processes from which they are 
abstracted.85 
So it seems that the third form, history as inquiry, does 
not (as van der Dussen thinks) replace the assertion of fact (the 
first form), but supplements and qualifies it, because historical 
inquiries do not take inquiry itself as their object (or objective): 
they have the assertion of fact as their object. History still 
asserts individual facts in Collingwood’s thinking from 1925/26 
onwards, but now it is the process culminating in the assertion 
that is in Collingwood’s sights. The emphasis now falls not on 
the “moment” of asserting a fact, but on the process leading to 
it, the historical method of question and answer.86 Collingwood 
had not however ignored this anyway: in Speculum Mentis he 
refers to it as “history in the special sense of the word,”87 and 
criticises the historian who “thinks that there is any way of 
determining a fact except by straightforward historical 
inquiry.”88 
And finally, the second and third forms, “history as 
process” and history as inquiry, overlap as (a) the process of 
inquiry, from which the moment of fact assertion is in fact 
                                                 
84 Collingwood, Principles of History, 137. 
85 Collingwood, New Leviathan, 241, 285. 
86 Collingwood, Idea of History, 14. 
87 Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, 203. 
88 Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, 211. 
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abstracted; as (b) and the object that the historian correctly 
pursues: namely, a process of thought; and specifically as (c) 
the assertion that describes the specific process by which one 
thing becomes another. 
The scale of forms proposed here is different from those 
discussed by Rubinoff and Goldstein, but not (I think) 
incompatible. For Goldstein, the forms in question are all of 
those conceptions detailed in The Idea of History, while for 
Rubinoff the forms are “levels” of experience,89 distinguished 
by the attitude of historical consciousness towards its object. 
Rubinoff means something altogether more complex than I 
intend here, mixing in different forms of philosophy as well, or, 
as he calls it, a “tripartite analysis of consciousness”.90 So in 
the first form, the object is assumed to be independently 
existing; the second form involves an attitude of relativism; and 
in the third form the historical consciousness operates in full 
awareness of its own presuppositions. The differences between 
my account and Rubinoff’s originate in my attention to the 
different definitions given to history in Collingwood’s writings, 
and attention to how they can be reconciled, whereas 
Rubinoff’s purpose is much broader than this. His “levels” refer 
to first-, second-, and third-order thinking about the forms of 
history, about the principle of idiography, for instance, rather 
                                                 
89 Rubinoff, 29, 132-133. 
90 Rubinoff, 378 n. 43; for a summary see also 371-372. 
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than thinking according to the principle itself. The 
philosophical “second-order” thought about a thought is a 
moment wherein a form of history becomes better defined; it 
does not itself constitute a new form of history.91 
 
CRITICAL POINTS 
The “lower and vaguer” forms of history, then, are discussed in 
Parts I to III of The Idea of History, as Leon Goldstein 
speculated nearly thirty years ago.92 But contrary to Goldstein’s 
reading, the forms of history and the stages of human thought 
as Collingwood narrates them in The Idea of History do not 
appear to be coterminous. He does not present logical priority 
as chronological priority; that is, he does not claim that the first 
form is established earliest, then incorporated into the second 
form later, and both then incorporated into the third and 
highest. Rather, Collingwood finds all three forms of history 
already roughly realized among the ancients: the two lower 
                                                 
91 Rubinoff has also proposed an interpretation of 
Collingwood’s philosophy of religion as a scale of forms: 
Lionel Rubinoff (ed.), Faith and Reason: Essays in the 
Philosophy of Religion by R. G. Collingwood (Chicago: 
Quadrangle, 1968), 93-107. On “orders” of thought see also 
Connelly, 60-61. 
92 Goldstein, 43; see however also 50. 
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forms in “theocratic history” and in “myth”.93 But ancient 
thought also evinces features of “scientific” historical inquiry, 
such as “research”,94 the critical attitude to evidence,95 and 
historians choosing their subjects (rather than allowing subjects 
to choose them).96 By recognizing history as a special type of 
research, Polybius refines this higher form.97 The practical 
value of research is established even earlier in the Greek 
conception of historical doxa.98 
A further correction to Goldstein’s account is that not 
everything described in The Idea of History should have a place 
in the scale of forms of history. For Collingwood, only 
philosophically “progressive” elements99 are reincorporated in 
higher forms. But there are also “retrograde” elements100 in past 
thought about the nature of history which are not lower forms, 
but intrusions. They are the “limitations” of a particular 
                                                 
93 Collingwood, Idea of History, 14-15; see also Collingwood, 
Speculum Mentis, 209, and Collingwood, Principles of 
History, 44. 
94 Collingwood, Idea of History, 18-19. 
95 Collingwood, Idea of History, 25; see also 62. 
96 Collingwood, Idea of History, 27. 
97 Collingwood, Idea of History, 35. 
98 Collingwood, Idea of History, 22–3, 35. 
99 Collingwood, Idea of History, 135. 
100 Collingwood, Idea of History, 135. 
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misconception of historical method,101 such as elements or 
presuppositions that are legendary, mythological, theocratic102 
or theocentric,103 eschatological (or futurological),104 
psychological,105 deterministic or positivistic,106 
substantialistic,107 polemical,108 cyclical,109 probabilistic or 
possibilistic,110 and, importantly, “realistic”—that is, containing 
the presupposition that the knowing makes no difference to 
what is known.111 Other mistakes about the nature of history 
include the “scissors and paste” method, the conflation of 
natural with historical processes,112 and the conflation of 
history and memory.113 Although such elements are dealt with 
                                                 
101 Collingwood, Idea of History, 25-8, 32. 
102 Collingwood, Idea of History, 18. 
103 Collingwood, Idea of History, 55. 
104 Collingwood, Idea of History, 54. 
105 Collingwood, Idea of History, 29-30, 92, 173. 
106 Collingwood, Idea of History, 30-1. 
107 Collingwood, Idea of History, 42-45, 81-85. 
108 Collingwood, Idea of History, 77. 
109 Collingwood, Essays in the Philosophy of History, 57-89, 
130. 
110 Collingwood, Idea of History, 204. 
111 Collingwood, Idea of History, 142. 
112 Collingwood, Idea of History, 93-133. 
113 Collingwood, Essays in the Philosophy of History, 126-127. 
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at length in The Idea of History, they do not belong to the true 
scale of forms of history. They should in fact be completely 
discarded, while the philosophically valuable elements that 
survive coalesce as the forms identified above, as they are 
always expressions of (1) “fact as such”, of (2) process, or of 
(3) historical inquiry. 
It follows, since all three forms of history are 
established early on, that we cannot expect the “critical points” 
that mark the transition from one form to the next to appear in 
an order that is both logical and chronological. These critical 
points in fact appear in several variants in The Idea of History, 
and in an order which is determined only by the thinkers who 
happen to identify and tackle them. But despite the 
chronological disorder in which these “critical points” arise, 
they are I think recognizably crises (as I will call them for 
simplicity) of the same three forms. 
 
The assertion of fact in crisis 
The first form of history—“the assertion of fact”, “making 
statements about the past” about actions with “definite places in 
a time series”114 —which seems to establish individual facts as 
part of the definition of history, rather than abstract laws, 
Collingwood identifies, as we have seen, early in The Idea of 
History, in theocratic history and myth. But the crisis of this 
                                                 
114 Collingwood, Idea of History, 14. 
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first form of history he narrates much later, and in several 
variants from Positivism to Spengler. Each time the crisis is 
brought about by the “cutting up” of phenomena into separate 
facts and falsely isolating them. Consequently “microscopic 
problems” abound:115 Bury finds the historical process 
contingent and unintelligible,116 and Windelband is driven to 
proclaim a science of the individual per se—even though, 
Collingwood says, “the whole tradition of European philosophy 
… has declared with one voice that this … is an impossibility”, 
and one to which Windelband “shows himself strangely 
blind.”117 The critical point, in short, is that individual facts can 
be asserted, but there can be no knowledge or understanding of 
them. 
This crisis Collingwood sometimes resolves by recourse 
to the second form of history, history as process. The problem 
with Bury is that he “forgets that the historical fact, as it 
actually exists and as the historian actually knows it, is always 
a process in which something is changing into something else. 
This element of process is the life of history.”118 And to Rickert 
Collingwood replies that “the essence of history lies not in its 
                                                 
115 Collingwood, Idea of History, 131; see also 143, 156, and 
161-162. 
116 Collingwood, Idea of History, 149-151. 
117 Collingwood, Idea of History, 167. 
118 Collingwood, Idea of History, 163. 
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consisting of individual facts … but in the process or 
development leading from one to another.”119 
But sometimes Collingwood resolves the same crisis by 
turning to the third form of history, history as inquiry. The 
question positivism ought to have asked, Collingwood writes, 
is “How is historical knowledge possible?”120—a move that 
retraces the transition from history to philosophy in Speculum 
Mentis, where “The fundamental principle of history itself, 
namely, the concreteness of the object, thus makes it impossible 
for the object to ignore the subject, and compels us to recognize 
an object to which the subject is organic.”121 Collingwood 
recognizes the same move in Croce, whose solution to his own 
variant of the crisis of individual fact led him to the theory of 
historical judgment.122 
History as “the assertion of fact”, or “fact as such”, fails 
as a definition of history on its own. But individual facts are 
part of the definition of history. They must however be 
(re)connected, either to the process from which they are 
abstracted, or to the mind that is asserting them. 
 
Process in crisis 
                                                 
119 Collingwood, Idea of History, 169. 
120 Collingwood, Idea of History, 133. 
121 Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, 244. 
122 Collingwood, Idea of History, 191-195. 
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The second form of history, which I have called “history as 
process”, is not fully adequate for Collingwood either: it “falls 
short … because the past that is preserved in the present is not a 
known past.”123 Like the process of time itself, it is merely 
experienced. So although Bergson’s philosophy and 
Alexander’s conception of “historicity”124 is an important 
contribution to the theory of history, it must be improved upon, 
because it describes not knowledge, but only what in Speculum 
Mentis is described as “an ultimate form of historical thought 
which is the most rudimentary of all. This is perception … 
History is thus, as a specific form of experience, identical with 
experience.”125 
The crisis of history as process, then, is the problem it 
creates for knowledge, a problem with a history of its own, 
from ancient Greece126 to Bradley127 and Bergson.128 
Collingwood expresses it as a “dilemma,”129 this time between 
a process which is not natural, but which can only be 
experienced, not known, and a process which can be known, 
                                                 
123 Collingwood, Idea of History, 188 (emphasis added). 
124 Collingwood, Idea of History, 210 n. 
125 Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, 204-205 (emphasis added). 
126 Collingwood, Idea of History, 20-21. 
127 Collingwood, Idea of History, 141. 
128 Collingwood, Idea of History, 187-190. 
129 Collingwood, Idea of History, 141, 174. 
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but is therefore a natural process. Again the solution is to accept 
neither “horn” of the dilemma, but to escape between them by 
renewing attention to another form of history. Collingwood 
identifies this move—the move from history as experience to 
the idea of knowledge itself—in Oakeshott, in whose work 
“Bradley’s dilemma is transcended”;130 and (fleetingly) in 
Dilthey.131 
 
Historical inquiry in crisis? 
There is no crisis for the third form of history, historical 
inquiry, since it is the highest form. But there appear to be 
crises, because of the ease with which historians and 
philosophers of history misconceive one of the other forms. 
Apparent crises are caused most commonly, Collingwood 
thinks, by false presuppositions about the nature of historical 
facts—which he identifies in “the German movement”, which 
is “always thinking … in terms of epistemology.”132 
At this point it is necessary to deal with the potential 
obstacle of Speculum Mentis, where Collingwood seems to say 
that there is a crisis for “history as such”133—a crisis which 
                                                 
130 Collingwood, Idea of History, 151-152; see however 158. 
131 Collingwood, Idea of History, 172. 
132 Collingwood, Idea of History, 184. 
133 Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, 246. 
34 
 
“destroys” it, and causes it to “break down”.134 We might 
bypass this apparent difficulty by simply reading the books 
separately, on their own merits, and not insist on consistency 
throughout Collingwood’s oeuvre. Or we might disqualify the 
contents of Speculum Mentis from Collingwood’s own 
authentic philosophy of history. But the former gives ground to 
one of the “disunity” verdicts outlined above, and the latter 
ignores the considerable compatibility of most of what is said 
about history in Speculum Mentis with Collingwood’s later or 
“mature” thought. 
Actually Speculum Mentis narrates the breakdown not 
of the highest form of history, but of the first form of history, 
which (as we have already seen) he would later narrate again in 
The Idea of History. The crisis Collingwood describes arises in 
the realization that the object, the concrete fact as such, is 
inseparable from historical thinking.135 In Speculum Mentis this 
prompts the transition to philosophy.136 But, he writes there, 
“though in the transition from history to philosophy, history as 
such is destroyed, the transition is so brief and so inevitable that 
much belonging to the historical frame of mind is taken over 
almost unchanged by the philosophical.”137 
                                                 
134 Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, 231-239. 
135 Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, 244. 
136 Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, 245-246. 
137 Collingwood, Speculum Mentis, 246. 
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Speculum Mentis then does not describe a crisis of 
history that Collingwood later changes his mind about, as van 
der Dussen thinks. It documents a crisis that arises out of 
mistaking the highest form of history, history as inquiry, for a 
lower form, and this rightly prompts a philosophical move for 
historical thought to better understand itself. Wherever, then, 
historical inquiry appears to be in crisis, what is in fact 
happening, for Collingwood, is that it is being mistaken for one 
of its lower forms. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
It seems, then, that Collingwood’s philosophy of history is 
indeed compatible with what he says about how philosophy is 
to be done. There are “forms” of history in Collingwood’s 
thought that are distinct, and which seem to relate as they are 
supposed to. He even narrates the “critical points” by which 
one form of history is “replaced” by a higher one: the (1) 
assertion of individual facts is supplemented and qualified by 
(2) the connection of individual facts in processes which are 
passively experienced, which is in turn supplemented and 
qualified by (3) the active investigation of questions. The 
accounts of history surveyed in parts I to III of The Idea of 
History (or at least I to II) are “lower and vaguer” ways of 
understanding history which, although they comprise 
something of the truly historical, also contain “retrograde” 
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elements which are discarded as higher forms clarify the lower. 
Where all three forms are present, “history is a kind of research 
or inquiry”138—a science in which the conclusions asserted are 
the facts of a reality that is itself a process. Because this is the 
highest form of history, it incorporates the two lower forms, 
and thus provides the most complete description of history as a 
philosophical concept. 
But the sort of “replacement” Collingwood has in mind 
is only ordered in this way logically. Chronologically, in the 
real history of philosophy of history, this clarification has 
operated in a curiously triangular way. All of the three forms 
are present in ancient thought, albeit mixed with non-historical 
elements which are gradually eradicated. Advances in 
philosophy of history are achieved for Collingwood when 
reflection on one form generates a critical point, or dilemma, 
which is then resolved when thought moves across to either of 
the other two forms of history and resolves the problem from 
there. 
It follows that the possible verdicts outlined above 
cannot be drawn: Collingwood does not abandon the scale of 
forms thesis he had prescribed in An Essay on Philosophical 
Method, and his later philosophy of history is not impaired by 
its absence. It is also not the case that Collingwood must have 
come to regret the account of history given in Speculum Mentis, 
                                                 
138 Collingwood, Idea of History, 9. 
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as van der Dussen thinks. But although Collingwood’s later 
thought seems to clarify rather than cancel his earlier thought, it 
is not necessarily true either that the “plan or architectonic” of 
his later thought is already laid out in Speculum Mentis, as 
Rubinoff thinks.139 As for the question of the “generic essence” 
of history, I see no reason to correct Goldstein’s view that 
Collingwood does not offer a statement of it—if it is right to 
assume that such a statement should be distinct from his 
philosophy of history taken as a whole. But it is perhaps 
anyway excessive to demand such a “generic” statement. Just 
because the highest form of history is stated and analysed in 
Collingwood’s work, it does not follow that the work of 
philosophers of history is done. That history is a kind of inquiry 
was, after all, realized roughly by the ancients. 
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